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2.1  Introduction 
Throughout much of the nineteenth century, federal workers were a valuable 
political asset. Patronage was the currency of political exchange. The right to 
place the local party faithful into relatively high-paying federal jobs, making 
them postmasters or customs officers, was coveted by  members of the House 
of Representatives, senators, cabinet members, and local political bosses. The 
president, who had the constitutional power to staff executive branch positions, 
traded these positions to members of Congress, local bosses, and other politi- 
cian; in exchange for their support on legislation and in reelection.’ Patronage 
jobs were known to be temporary, subject to the political fortunes of  each 
worker’s  benefactor and political party. Not  only was  patronage an integral 
part of  party politics in the United States, but it was  viewed as a means of 
democratizing the government. Anyone with the right political connections 
could obtain a government job, at least for a short while. 
Nevertheless, in the late nineteenth century, with the enthusiastic support of 
the president Congress voted to restrict the number of patronage positions that 
were available. With the enactment of  the Pendleton Act (22 Stat. 403) on 16 
January 1883, the process was established by which patronage was to give way 
gradually to merit-based employment. By  1904, only twenty-one years after 
the Pendleton Act was passed, over 50 percent of the total federal civilian labor 
force was under merit provisions (U.S. House of  Representatives  1976). No 
longer were federal employees to direct their attention primarily to the political 
needs of  their patrons and party. Instead, they were to provide government 
services competently and efficiently. Merit, not political influence, was to de- 
termine employment. Moreover, after the Pendleton Act, federal workers were 
gradually extended protection from removal through actions of the president 
and the Congress. By the mid-twentieth century, they effectively had tenure in 
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their federal positions but were required to be politically neutral.* With these 
changes, most vestiges of patronage that had characterized the organization of 
the federal labor force since the founding of the Republic were replaced by 
bureaucratic civil service rules. 
From this summary of events, it is clear that the shift from patronage to 
merit in the federal government represented  a major institutional change in 
the hiring and administration of the federal labor force. This shift to merit is 
commonly portrayed as a victory by  reform groups over an unwilling Con- 
gre~s.~  According to this view, civic-minded reformers objected to the ineffi- 
ciencies and corruption alleged to be inherent in a system of patronage, and 
they worked to deny the reelection of members of Congress who were support- 
ers of the spoils system and to replace them with members sympathetic to 
reform. Although reform groups played a role in mobilizing opposition to pat- 
ronage, we find an explanation that solely emphasizes exogenous pressures for 
institutional change in the organization of the federal labor force incomplete. 
For example, the federal civil service reform associations generally cited as 
major proponents of the shift to merit employment had largely withered away 
by  the end of the nineteenth century (Hoogenboom  1968, 256-67).  Even in 
their absence, however, the proportion of federal employees covered under the 
merit system continued to expand rapidly between 1900 and 1930. Moreover, 
the notion that reform groups somehow carried the day against hesitant, elected 
officials ignores more fundamental forces underlying  the shift from patron- 
age-the  incentives of politicians to replace a system that was no longer capa- 
ble of winning electoral support. In our examination of the adoption of the 
merit system, federal politicians play a central, leading role, rather than a pe- 
ripheral or reluctant one. 
In this chapter, we reconsider the move from patronage to merit in federal 
employment and demonstrate why the president and the Congress would find 
it in their interests to restrict the number of patronage positions and to install 
bureaucratic rules for the hiring and management of federal employees. The 
analysis, together with the analytic framework presented in appendix A, ex- 
plicitly links the growth of the federal labor force in the post-Civil War period 
to civil service reform. It makes it clear why the president would take the lead 
in reducing the number of patronage positions, even though historically the 
exchange of patronage had been key in obtaining congressional  support for 
legislation and other policy initiatives. In addition, implications are drawn as 
to which members of Congress would be most affected by the growing costs 
of patronage and, hence, would join the president in supporting institutional 
change. These  implications  are  examined empirically, using  congressional 
votes on major civil service reform legislation. 
The overriding factor that  changed the way  in which  federal politicians 
viewed patronage was the growth in the size of the federal labor force. Com- 
mensurate increases in the number of patronage positions raised the costs of 
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the performance of patronage employees. We describe, and show formally in 
appendix A, how the president was forced to devote more and more time to 
the allocation and monitoring of patronage appointments, diverting attention 
from other executive  duties. Similarly,  members  of  Congress were  also re- 
quired to spend more time on patronage issues, including bargaining with the 
president  for positions and seeing that  they  were filled by  individuals  who 
would be obliged to them and who would also advance their political goals. In 
addition to these costs, federal politicians faced growing complaints from vot- 
ers that the expanding patronage labor force was not providing them with the 
services they desired from the federal government. The monitoring problem 
was made worse by the physical separation of politicians in Washington, D.C., 
from those at the  state and local level, who worked directly with patronage 
employees. These two groups of politicians had different constituents and con- 
flicting aims regarding the use of federal workers. Scandals, inefficiencies, and 
corruption  associated  with  patronage  employment  damaged  national  politi- 
cians in the eyes of business and commercial groups and many voters, while the 
net benefits of patronage generally remained large for the local party machine. 
The shift from patronage, then, reflected a growing dissatisfaction with the 
spoils system among the president and many members of Congress. These con- 
cerns generally have not been addressed by those who previously have studied 
civil service reform; hence, much that is important to the story has been left 
out. We argue that federal politicians needed a new means for organizing fed- 
eral workers and for more efficiently delivering federal services. The personnel 
rules adopted through passage of the Pendleton Act reflected the desires of the 
president and the Congress both to reduce the costs of patronage by improving 
the quality of federal workers and to constrain competition among politicians 
over the control of  federal positions. In the end, the last objective required 
political neutrality for most of the federal workforce. Our analysis incorporates 
arguments in the historical literature regarding civil  service reform with the 
economics of organization. We also draw on concepts from the public choice 
literature in examining the incentives of politicians to move from patronage to 
merit. This approach provides a more comprehensive explanation for the tim- 
ing of the shift to merit, the identity of the interest groups involved, and why 
particular politicians would be responsive to those groups’ demands. 
2.2  Patronage 
Since the early days of the Republic, patronage was viewed as a necessary 
and useful method for staffing federal offices. The number of positions to be 
filled was initially relatively small, perhaps 5,000 in 1816, with 500 positions 
in Washington, D.C. (US. Department of Commerce 1975, 1101). The Consti- 
tution granted the president the right to fill executive branch offices, and the 
notion, especially under the Jackson administration, was that these positions 
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federal offices, a practice that could lead to the development of an entrenched 
civil  service elite and would be counter to the democratic goals of  the new 
government. The positions were relatively  simple ones-postmasters,  postal 
clerks, land office clerks, surveyors, and customhouse employees. The assign- 
ment of these jobs became a central element of the early political party struc- 
ture, which was largely locally based. In his study of the Jacksonian era, Leo- 
nard White emphasizes that the connection between national  politicians and 
local party organizations was patronage: “The success of..  . local organiza- 
tions seemed to depend much more on securing office, contracts, and favors 
for their members than on campaigning over disputed issues of statesmanship” 
(19.54, 84). 
Patronage positions were awarded to the party faithful, who engaged in cam- 
paign work and contributed part of their salaries in the form of political assess- 
ments. These assessments on the salaries of patronage workers were a means 
of transferring federal tax revenues to political parties. The payments ranged 
from 2 to 10 percent of an individual patronage worker’s salary, depending on 
the position  held. Solicitation letters were sent by  the party  to each worker, 
return envelopes were provided to ensure that payments were made, and com- 
pliance was carefully monitored. Those who did not contribute the requested 
amount lost their positions (Fowler 1943, 157-60).  Federal patronage jobs ap- 
pear to have paid more than the market wage for comparable private positions 
in order to cover the payment of  assessment^.^ 
These funds were an important source of campaign financing in the nine- 
teenth century. For example, Louise Overacker (1932,  103-9)  states that, in 
1878, the Republican Congressional Committee alone raised $106,000 for po- 
litical campaigns, of which $80,000 came from federal employees. The control 
of  assessment funds rested mainly  within the local party apparat~s.~  Thomas 
Reeves provides an illuminating account of the assessment collection activities 
carried out by Chester A. Arthur, illustrating the potential for conflict between 
national and local party officials, as federal employees were often “required to 
contribute simultaneously to the national, county, local, and now state commit- 
tees” (1969,581). Nevertheless, the critical support of local party machines for 
congressional candidates depended on the latter’s ability to obtain patronage 
positions from the president. The president, in turn, exchanged patronage for 
promises of support on various bills and policies and for reelection. Those who 
held patronage positions did not have tenure, and they expected to be  (and 
were) removed routinely after elections, whenever their patrons were defeated. 
For example, during the Cleveland administration, 43,087 fourth-class post- 
masters were either removed, suspended, or asked to resign to make room for 
Democratic party stalwarts (Fowler  1943, 306). These were the rules of the 
game, and they provided for a partisan federal bureaucracy. When the govern- 
ment was small, patronage provided for close allegiance between appointees 
and their political benefactors, and as a result the behavior of the employee 
could be monitored at a relatively low cost. As such, patronage was a standard 16  Chapter2 
and generally respected practice for promoting the ideals of equality and social 
mobility and was the cornerstone for the development and maintenance of the 
political parties.6 
So long as the interests of  federal politicians and the local party machine 
coincided, the spoils system was mutually beneficial. To  obtain the party’s 
nomination and support in the campaign, candidates for federal political of- 
fices were required to permit the machine to play a role in the dispensation of 
the jobs and favors that they acquired on election and to be responsive to the 
demands of local party leaders.’ In return, assessment money was made avail- 
able for campaign expenses, and the local party boss used the promise of pat- 
ronage to motivate campaign workers to get out the vote. Jobs were given to 
those who worked for the organization and voted for the party’s candidates. 
Hence, having a say in who obtained patronage positions provided benefits to 
members of  Congress. Patronage power enhanced their positions within the 
party and among some voters, and it created a form of political indenture. 
Because of  the value of patronage employees, a major prize for a party on 
winning the presidency was access to the spoils. Among the chief patronage 
positions were those of postmaster, postal clerk, and mail carrier. The provision 
of postal services was the major activity of the federal government in the nine- 
teenth century. In  188  1, for example, 59 percent of all federal employees were 
in the postal service (U.S.  Civil Service Commission, Annual Report, 1893,9, 
230). The allocation of these positions among the various competing claimants 
involved considerable negotiation among relevant members of Congress, the 
president, and the postmaster general (Fowler 1943, 140-45). The postmaster 
general was one of the president’s chief advisers in political negotiations with 
members of Congress, providing information on those who had received postal 
positions, who had requested more, what positions were available, and whose 
requests were inconsistent with their votes on the president’s program. In 1890, 
there was an average of 250 postal workers per congressional district and some 
1,700 applications for those positions (Fowler 1943, 215). 
The exchange of  valuable patronage privileges was a means by  which the 
president and members of Congress reached agreement on legislative policies. 
The power to nominate allowed the president to exchange patronage appoint- 
ments for favorable votes in Congress on various bills, and there was consider- 
able logrolling and compromise. As Theodore Roosevelt noted regarding up- 
coming bargaining with Congress, “If they’ll vote for my measures I’ll appoint 
their nominees to Federal jobs. And  I’m going to tell them so” (Van Riper 
1958, 1  85).s Although senior office selections required Senate approval, ap- 
pointments to the more numerous lower-level positions could be made without 
the consent of  the Senate, and there were few restrictions on who could be 
hired. While it was customary for the president to consult members of  the 
House on appointments to postmasterships in  their districts, this “congres- 
sional courtesy” implied no guarantee of  an app~intment.~  Members of Con- 
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positions, and considerable time and effort were required to promote their in- 
terests (Fish 1905, 173-80). 
When Congress and the president disagreed, the president could use the con- 
trol of patronage to discipline recalcitrant members of Congress. For example, 
President Andrew Johnson used patronage in an unsuccessful attempt to pro- 
mote his reconstruction policies at the end of  the Civil War.  A political ally 
wrote Johnson, “Our three most important officers as far as patronage and in- 
fluence are concerned are Collector of Customs, Postmaster, and Assessor of 
the Third District (Stewart). Each of these offices has a large number of men 
under him filling responsible positions and daily coming in contact with the 
people of the city. If  all of  these officers were sincere and earnest friends of 
the President, acting in concert in political matters, there would be no difficulty 
in controlling the city and state. . . . With proper management we will send a 
full delegation to the next House to support the President, and also a Senator 
in place of Creswell” (Fowler 1943, 132). 
2.3  Changes in the Benefits and Costs of Patronage 
2.3.1  Growth of the Federal Labor Force and the Increased Costs of 
Patronage 
The historical circumstances surrounding the shift from patronage to merit 
are closely related to the size of the federal labor force. In the post-Civil  War 
period, as the economy expanded, becoming more urban and industrialized, 
demands were made on the federal government to increase the services that it 
provided. In response, the size of government grew dramatically. Table 2.1 lists 
federal civilian employment between 1816 and 1911. Although by  the end of 
the Civil War the federal government was the largest employer in the country 
with 51,020 civilian employees in  1871, within thirty years the civilian labor 
force was nearly five times larger at over 239,000 employees (U.S. Department 
of Commerce 1975, 1102-3).  Government income and expenditures grew cor- 
respondingly. For example, federal receipts, most of which came from customs 
Table 2.1  Federal Government Civilian Employment 
Year  Employment  I  Year  Employment 
1816  4,837 
1821  6,914 
1831  11,491 
1841  18,038 
1851  26,274 
1861  36,672 
1871  5 1,020 
1881  100,020 
1891  157,442 
1901  239,476 
191  1  395.905 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (1975,  1102-3). 18  Chapter2 
duties, rose from $42,000,000 in 1861 to $393,000,000 in 1891, an increase of 
over eight-fold (U.S. Department of Commerce 1975, 1  106).1° 
With the  growth  in  the  size of  the  labor force, the costs of  negotiating, 
screening, and monitoring patronage positions increased. This new condition 
strained the personal nature of the patronage staffing process and the political 
exchanges built around it. Members of  Congress and the president often had 
to meet with job seekers to evaluate their political merits and fitness for their 
regular assignment. For the president and members of Congress, the allocation 
of patronage increasingly became a tremendous burden on their time. In 1870, 
James Garfield claimed that “one-third of the working hours of  Senators and 
Representatives is hardly sufficient to meet the demands made upon them in 
reference to appointments of  office.””  As the demands of  the system grew, 
the president’s role was being reduced to that of a position broker, dispensing 
hundreds of jobs under great pressure.  These duties diverted  attention from 
other, presumably more presidential, responsibilities. In the case of James Gar- 
field, the costs to allocating patronage were especially high. On the morning 
of 2 July  1881, shortly after having assumed the office of  president,  he was 
assassinated by a disappointed office seeker. 
Since the president had control over the allocation of patronage, there was 
more than occasional conflict between the president and members of Congress 
over appointments and removal. Such conflict, too, became more intense in the 
post-Civil  War period. While members of Congress attempted to claim prop- 
erty rights over patronage positions, the president sought to maintain control 
over those positions and the range of possible trades with other politicians. 
One of the most notorious conflicts over control of the federal labor force 
invoived a battle in  187  1 for control of  patronage in the New York custom- 
house between New York  senators Fenton  and Conkling. Following embar- 
rassing public  exposis of  corruption  associated with  the conflict,  President 
Grant attempted to obtain greater authority in patronage appointments at the 
New York customhouse but met with only limited success. Senator Conkling 
and the local party machine aligned with him then gradually assumed control 
of patronage. President Hayes, who followed Grant, continued to try to assert 
presidential authority over New  York  customhouse officials. In  1877, Hayes 
named replacements for a number of key senior positions, but they were re- 
jected by the Senate, and Conkling retained control over the New York spoils. 
Competition among local machines, the Senate, and the president over the New 
York customs and postal positions continued unabated through the Hayes ad- 
ministration. 
The president’s concern about scandals in the operation of federal govern- 
ment facilities reflected more than a desire to maintain control over patronage. 
It also reflected  a growing concern about the image of  the president and the 
effectiveness of the administration in providing government services to voters 
throughout the country. With narrow constituencies, the local party machine 
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number of patronage jobs, even if there were complaints from other groups 
about the efficiency and corruption of local patronage employees. On the other 
hand, as a national political figure with a much broader constituency, the presi- 
dent was in the position  of bearing the brunt of voter anger over poorly run 
facilities and the fallout over patronage  battles. Moreover,  lacking effective 
control over the staffing of  particular  facilities, the president garnered fewer 
benefits from the patronage retained for presidential appointments (see Hoo- 
genboom 1968, 155-204;  Van  Riper  1958, 182-89;  and Kaufman  1965, 23- 
26). Given  limitations on the president's  time, more appointment  decisions 
were delegated to others, increasing the risk that the political tribute and alle- 
giance paid by patronage workers would be to those who actually distributed 
the spoils, not the president.  To a somewhat lesser degree, members of Con- 
gress faced a similar problem in the management of patronage appointments. 
The agency problem that the president and members of Congress confronted 
in the use of patronage workers arose in part because of the personal nature of 
the services that patronage workers  offered  local  constituent^.'^ Those who 
received benefits from federal patronage workers attributed them to the local 
party machine with whom they had contact rather than to the federal politicians 
who provided patronage. As a consequence, local political officials generally 
were held in high esteem, and this situation encouraged those officials to act 
independently of Washington. Once federal politicians relinquished patronage 
positions to lower party officials, they faced a loss of control over their appoint- 
ments as local officials and the patronage workers, who owed their allegiance 
to them, acted opportunistically.  These problems were aggravated by the fact 
that the constituents of many national politicians had interests that were differ- 
ent from the narrow, parochial interests of most concern to local party officials, 
The agency problem associated with different constituencies and control of 
the labor force was also compounded by the growing number of federal patron- 
age employees. As the number of workers grew, careful supervision of patron- 
age appointees to ensure that their actions were in the interests of the president 
and Congress became more difficult.  Indeed, by  the early  1870s, patronage 
was seen by a growing number of federal politicians as a major problem for 
them among voters. High turnover was inherent in the system, and patronage 
workers had other obligations than the provision of federal services. They ar- 
ranged political meetings, escorted voters to the polls, and attended party cau- 
cuses. For many postal workers, there was little time for post office business.I4 
Many workers appear to have been hired just for their ability to pay  assess- 
ments or to satisfy local political debts. 
Business  organizations  were  especially  critical  of  the  patronage  system 
since the growing commercialization  of  the economy in the post-Civil  War 
period depended on the smooth functioning of the postal system for shipments 
and billing receipts and of the customhouses for the import of intermediate and 
final goods.  Over half  the membership  of  civil service reform  associations 
came from business groups. These groups developed a keen sense of the limi- 20  Chapter2 
tations of the spoils system in providing dependable services. They argued that 
“the primary needs of  the merchants and the great interests of national com- 
merce [have] been constantly surrendered to the demands of the party” (Skow- 
ronek 1982, 51). 
Scandals and charges of fraud and inefficiency were linked to the country’s 
largest post offices and customhouses. Patronage was blamed, and the presi- 
dent and members of Congress with major federal facilities in their districts 
were increasingly pressured to reform the system. Administration of customs 
was also important because tariff duties accounted for by far the largest share 
of federal government receipts in-the nineteenth century. Three-fourths of all 
customs duties were  collected in the port of  New  York, and the New York 
customs collector was one of the most powerful federal officeholders. The New 
York Times discussed efforts to improve the performance of the New York cus- 
tomhouse, reporting:  “At  no point had the defects of the previous  method of 
appointment [patronage] seemed more obvious. . . . The customs service at the 
Port of New York had been properly considered as the climax of inefficiency 
and corruption” (24 March 1873). The Chicago Tribune reported that the prob- 
lem of patronage was that “the appointees of congressmen and private individ- 
uals are expected to render a dual service, a service to the government and a 
service to their patrons” (18 November  1882). 
The Jay Commission (US. House of  Representatives  1877), appointed by 
the secretary of  the Treasury to investigate five large customhouses in New 
York, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New Orleans, and San Francisco, argued that 
the New York customhouse had a labor force, appointed through patronage, 
that was at least 20 percent too large. The commission compared the costs 
and functioning of US.  customhouses with those in Great Britain, which were 
staffed by merit service employees and, according to the commission, much 
more effectively run. 
Similarly, complaints were made by business groups against the New York 
and other large post offices for incompetence in mail delivery (U.S. House of 
Representatives  1881). They pointed to claims that bags of undelivered  mail 
lay forgotten in locked rooms and that the customhouses in Prussia and Britain 
were four to five times more cost efficient per volume of work done (Skowro- 
nek 1982,5  1-55).  A merit-based labor force “promised merchants and bankers 
an administrative system that would ‘protect their interests and secure efficient 
services in the departments in which they were most directly affected’ ” (New 
York Times, 9 September 1881, quoted in Skowronek 1982,52). 
Because of  repeated  charges of corruption  and inefficiencies  in the New 
York customhouse  and post office between  1872 and  1875, President Grant 
attempted  to implement  merit hiring  at the  facilities under  a Civil Service 
Commission  that was created  in  187  1. Appropriations  for the commission, 
however, lapsed after 1875, and it was not until passage of the Pendleton Act 
that the commission again became active.l5 In both cases, the president met 
with the entrenched opposition of the New York party machine. 21  Replacing Political Patronage with Merit 
Management problems associated with the growth in the size of the federal 
labor force appear to have been the major factor behind the increasing dissatis- 
faction of the president and members of Congress with federal patronage in 
the post-Civil  War period. The notion that control is lost as an organization 
increases in size is an integral part of  the theory  of  the firm. For example, 
Oliver Williamson (1975,  117-26)  argues that the distinctive advantages of 
internal organization are impaired and transactional diseconomies incurred as 
firm size increases. Bounded rationality and specialized communication and 
decision-making arrangements require new hierarchical layers and costly coor- 
dination mechanisms in order to accommodate larger firms.I6 
The linkage between organization  size and labor control problems is also 
made in the literature on government bureaucracy by  Gordon Tullock (1965, 
142-92),  who argues that authority deteriorates within the bureaucracy with 
increases in the size of the agency. Anthony Downs (1967, 143) points out that, 
the larger any organization becomes, the weaker is the control over the actions 
exercised by those at the top. Downs and Tullock emphasize opportunities for 
deliberate distortion by those at the bottom of the hierarchy. 
The argument that control problems associated with the size of  the labor 
force were the major factor in explaining the rise in the costs of patronage and 
the associated adoption of merit-based hiring is supported by evidence from 
state and local governments. Civil service reform at the state and city level 
also began in the late nineteenth century, and the pattern of adoption across 
jurisdictions appears similar to that observed at the federal level. The most 
populous states and cities with the correspondingly largest government labor 
forces tended to be the earliest adopters of civil service reform. According to 
the Council of State Governments, seven of  the ten most populous states by 
population had adopted  statewide merit systems by  1941: New York,  1883; 
Illinois, 1905; Ohio, 1913; California, 1913; Michigan, 1937; Massachusetts, 
1885; and New  Jersey,  1908.17 Of the remaining less populous  thirty-eight 
states, twenty-five, or 66 percent,  had no statewide civil service system by 
1941  .I8 
Records compiled by the International City Managers’ Association reveal a 
similar pattern: municipal merit systems were in operation in all the thirteen 
largest U.S.  cities by  1920, and six of those had merit service rules as early as 
1900.19  Calls for civil service reform in the larger cities followed the decline 
in the quality of government services under patronage and associated demands 
by reformers for more efficient government.20 
2.3.2  The Costs of Patronage and the Changing Economic and Political 
Environment in the Post-Civil  War Period 
The rising costs of negotiating, screening, and monitoring patronage work- 
ers facing the president and members of Congress owing to the growth of the 
labor force were intensified by important changes in the structure of the party 
in the late nineteenth century. Prior to the Civil War, American political parties 22  Chapter2 
developed  largely  as loose confederations of  local  institutions  (see  Kolbe 
1985; Skowronek 1982; Chambers 1975; Stokes 1975). Indeed, Richard Kolbe 
(1985, 33) describes early American parties as factions, not well-organized 
national groups. In this way, the parties mirrored the national economy, which, 
because of high transportation costs, tended to be a collection of regional econ- 
omies.21  Parties focused on parochial concerns to win elections for their candi- 
dates, and patronage was used to organize campaigns and to fill appointive 
offices. Assessments from patronage workers provided local party machines 
with election and administrative  funds from federal tax revenues.22  Charles 
Stewart (1989, 26) argues that patronage kept local interests loosely bound in 
national political parties in the nineteenth century. 
In  the post-Civil  War  period,  the rural, relatively isolated  nature of  the 
American economy began to change rapidly. The economy became increas- 
ingly urbanized,  industrial, and integrated  through lower transportation and 
information costs, linking labor, product, and capital markets. Per capita in- 
come rose. Expansion in the size of markets and technological change brought 
increases in the size, scope, and complexity of production.23 
In part, because of the Union success in the Civil War, which established the 
domination of the federal government over regional interests (the South), and 
because  of  the growth of  a truly national economy after  1865, politics and 
political parties began to take on a more national identity. Stephen Skowronek 
(1982, 39-40)  discusses the change in the structure of American political par- 
ties in the late nineteenth century. While the earlier role of parties had been to 
direct the dispersion of  particularistic benefits from the federal government 
downward to the localities, as the century progressed the parties were called 
on io take a more national role. Social interactions and economic contacts were 
becoming increasingly national in scope, with a corresponding rise in private 
interest groups demanding new and more complex services from the federal 
government that transcended local boundaries. These conditions brought about 
the gradual and at least relative replacement of the locally oriented party de- 
mocracy. 
Interstate coalitions, such as the Grangers, the National Association of Man- 
ufacturers, and the National Civil Service Reform League, lobbied Congress 
for legislation that they desired. There were demands for the setting and regula- 
tion of railroad rates and tariffs to promote domestic businesses and for estab- 
lishment and enforcement of a sound money supply policy, antitrust law, and 
meat inspection procedures (to promote exports).24  Such legislation as the Pen- 
dleton Act of  1883, the Interstate Commerce Act of  1887 (24 Stat. 379), the 
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (26 Stat. 209), the McKinley Tariff Act of  1890 
(26 Stat. 567), and the Meat Inspection Acts of  1890 (26 Stat. 414), and 1891 
(26 Stat. 1089) was enacted, representing new and unprecedented intervention 
by  the federal government into the American economy. Not  only did these 
groups call for the provision of new services, but they also demanded that such 
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improved. In order to be responsive to these interest group demands and to 
organize institutional reactions to them, such as the creation of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, political parties became more national in scope. This 
new direction tended to reduce the relative importance of the locally based 
party and machines, although machines kept a place in local politi~s.~~ 
Tension between local and national party officials increased, as their inter- 
ests and constituents began to diverge. As Skowronek notes, “[Local] Parties 
in this context were the cornerstone of an old order, an order that presumed the 
absence  of  strong national  controls.  The hold that the  party  machines  had 
gained over American institutions would have to be broken before new centers 
of  national institutional  authority could be built. The expansion of  national 
administrative capacities thus threatened to undermine party government in the 
nation that first gave it full expression” (1982, 40).26 
Support for patronage became a central element in this division. While the 
local party depended almost exclusively on patronage for campaign funds and 
workers, the emerging national parties, many members of Congress, and the 
president were finding that patronage was losing its appeal as a source of votes. 
Not only did patronage provide an inept and corrupt labor force and prove to 
be a source of increasing scandal and embarrassment, as congressional hear- 
ings in the 1870s indicate, but assessments were also becoming insufficient to 
fund the growing costs of  national, state, and congressional district political 
campaigns. 
Table 2.2 outlines  the pattern  of  presidential  campaign  expenses  for the 
Democratic and Republican parties between 1860 and 1904. Much early cam- 
paigning for political office took place in newspaper columns, with the candi- 
dates traveling little. Editors’ fortunes rose and fell with the political success 
of their patrons. Pamphlets about and biographies of candidates were handed 
out at campaign rallies, organized by local party officials. Candidates for fed- 
eral offices generally were not in attendance. Widespread barnstorming by fed- 
eral candidates was introduced by Stephen Douglas in 1860 and became more 
central to election campaigns as the nineteenth century progressed. As more 
Table 2.2  Expenses for Presidential Campaigns 
Year  Expenses ($)”  I  Year  Expenses ($)” 
1860  150,000 
1864  175,000 
1868  225,000 
1872  300,000 
1876  1,850,000 
1880  1,455,000 
1884  2,700,000 
1888  2,205,000 
1892  4,050,000 
1896  4,025,000 
1900  3,425,000 
1904  2,796,000 
Source: Compiled from Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 2d sess., 18 April  1910, 45:4931, as 
reported in Overacker (1932,71) and adjusted by Alexander (1971,3878). 
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and more people had to be reached and greater efforts were made to reach 
them, costs rose. The table reveals that presidential campaign expenses in 1900 
were over twenty times those in  1860, and the latter part of  the nineteenth 
century is generally conceded to have been a period of deflation. As political 
campaigns became broader and more costly, political parties that had relied 
previously on patronage assessments turned to contributions from national in- 
terest groups and wealthy individuals to fund campaigns for state and federal 
offices.*’ 
Constituent demand  for the more  effective provision  of  services by  the 
growing federal labor force, then, coincided with the desire of the president 
and members of Congress to strengthen the national party and to weaken the 
local machine. A merit system for federal employment was seen as breaking 
the hold of the party bosses over political institutions and the patronage labor 
force and as facilitating the creation of  a “responsible” national party system 
(see Skowronek 1982,54). George Curtis, a founder of the National Civil Ser- 
vice Reform League and one of the leading critics of patronage, explained that 
“the goal of civil service reform was not ‘merely a system of  examinations’ 
for administrative appointments but ‘the restoration of political parties to their 
true function,’ which is the maintenance and enforcement of national policies” 
(Curtis 1887, 358, quoted in Skowronek 1982,54). 
On this same issue, Donald Stokes (1975, 192-96) dates the rise of the mod- 
em U.S. party structure from the 187Os, with the concomitant rise of a national 
party  administrative apparatus and institutional changes that  weakened the 
power of the local political machine: direct political party primary elections, 
civil service reform, the adoption of  the secret ballot, and the direct election 
of senators.Z8  The local party had maintained itself through the control of pat- 
ronage, the collection of  assessments, the monitoring of  voters through the 
open ballot, loose registration requirements, and the legislative selection of 
senators, which increased the role of the local machine in brokering the assign- 
ment of Senate offices. 
Within this context, the president and certain members of  Congress reas- 
sessed their position on patronage and civil service reform.29  Civil service re- 
form was an essential ingredient in, indeed a prerequisite for, this process of 
change. If the federal government were to respond to new demands or calls for 
the improved provision of existing services, it had to wrest control of the labor 
force from the local party apparatus. With the federal government doing more, 
the organization and performance of federal workers became an election issue 
for the president and members of Congress, beginning in the early 1870s. The 
Republican party adopted merit reform as a political plank in  1872, and the 
Democratic party followed in 1876. Rutherford Hayes was elected president in 
1876, after a campaign in which he promised to change the patronage system. 
Although Hayes did not follow through as completely as reformers had hoped, 
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organize political pressure, and the National Civil Service Reform League was 
organized in August 188  1. With the assassination of President Garfield in 188  1 
and continued controversies over the collection of assessments from patronage 
workers and those workers' overall performance, civil service reform became 
one of the principal election issues in 1882.3" 
2.4  The Design of a New Institution: An Analytic Framework 
The historical literature on civil service reform portrays the movement either 
as one of dedicated reformers battling a Congress reluctant to adopt a merit 
system or as one of skillful incumbent politicians seeking to deny their compet- 
itors access to patronage should they lose office. We  address these issues in 
this and the following chapter, and we  argue that the president and the Con- 
gress had other important reasons to support reform. Influential constituents 
were demanding alterations in the organization of the federal labor force, re- 
ducing the incentives of  the president and certain members of  Congress to 
maintain an  all-patronage workforce. If  these politicians were responsive to 
constituent demands, the growing public dissatisfaction with patronage in the 
late nineteenth century should have led to directed efforts for institutional 
change. 
Contemporary analyses indicate that roll-call voting by members of  Con- 
gress closely reflects constituent intere~ts.~'  This finding is consistent with the 
postulate that politicians behave as if  they  were attempting to maximize the 
votes that they expect to receive in the next election.3z  Although reelection is 
considered a ,standard motive for twentieth-century politicians, it appears to 
have been on the minds of most federal politicians in the late nineteenth cen- 
tury as well.33  For example, in the 1880 election, 74 percent of the members 
of the Forty-sixth House of Representatives sought reelection. Of those, nearly 
87 percent were successful. Similarly, in the 1882 election, 61  percent of the 
members of the Forty-seventh House sought reelection, of  whom 75 percent 
were ~uccessfu1.~~ 
In this section, the reelection postulate is used to develop implications about 
which politicians were most likely to favor civil service reform and to explain 
the choices made in adopting the initial rules for the merit system. As part of 
the argument, we describe why the president would take the lead in controlling 
the growth of patronage. Unlike the earlier historical literature, our approach 
places federal politicians at the center of the civil service reform movement. 
For the president and each member of Congress, a decision to alter the long- 
standing federal patronage system involved a calculated trade-off (in terms of 
votes) in expected costs and benefits. In the late nineteenth century, members 
of the House, senators, and the president were subject to voter scrutiny. House 
members were directly elected in their districts, and voter support for reelec- 
tion depended, in part, on the popularity of the patronage institution and on 26  Chapter2 
how well patronage employees provided federal services. Even though  sena- 
tors were not directly elected at the time civil service reform was being consid- 
ered, their appointment by  state legislatures also depended on the success of 
their party in elections. Indeed, senators were often state party leaders.35  Simi- 
larly, the president’s reelection chances were affected by  voter evaluation of 
the effectiveness of  the administration. High-ranking party officials, particu- 
larly the president and members of the Senate, bore the brunt of public discon- 
tent with the effectiveness of patronage workers. 
Despite the increased unpopularity of patronage among many voters in the 
late nineteenth century, neither the president nor members of Congress could 
distance themselves from its problems by  unilaterally  withdrawing  from the 
spoils system. Collective action among politicians was required. If a member 
of Congress unilaterally withdrew  from patronage  competition, other politi- 
cians would obtain control of the appointments, and the problems of monitor- 
ing the provision  of constituent  services and the blame for the poor perfor- 
mance of patronage workers would remain. Hence, federal politicians  had to 
decide, as a group, whether to maintain patronage or to adopt a more politically 
neutral method  of  selecting and administering  the  federal  labor force. Ob- 
taining a group consensus took time. Civil service reform legislation was intro- 
duced into Congress and promoted by the president as early as 1864, but no 
legislative agreement was reached until 1883 with the Pendleton Act. 
Public dissatisfaction with patronage, especially in the large postal and cus- 
toms facilities, would have reduced the popular support received by both the 
president and members of Congress. But the growth of the all-patronage labor 
force presented the president with an especially difficult management problem. 
He‘had both to improve the performance of federal workers and to control the 
size of the pool of patronage employees. The ultimate solution to this problem 
was the adoption of the merit system. While the formal arguments illustrating 
this management problem are presented in appendix A, the essence of the argu- 
ment is outlined here. 
Under the authority granted by the Constitution for filling executive branch 
positions, the president held the property rights to patronage. Appointments 
were traded with members of  Congress for support on various policy initia- 
tives. In effect, the president was a monopoly seller of patronage, who sought 
to maximize the returns from these exchanges. However, the implicit “price,” 
or what each member of Congress was willing to pledge in exchange for pat- 
ronage, depended on the total number and productivity of patronage workers. 
The size of the patronage pool affected what each member of Congress was 
willing to give up in exchange for appointees because monitoring costs grew 
with the number of positions. With additional appointees, more effort was re- 
quired to ensure that they worked on the behalf of their benefactor. Hence, the 
amount of time that any member of Congress could devote to monitoring lim- 
ited the number of patronage positions that could be effectively utilized. As a 
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ing to give up less to the president for an additional patronage position, yield- 
ing a negatively sloped demand curve for patronage. The president could po- 
tentially  act  as  a  price  setter,  but,  in  order  to  maximize  the  returns  from 
patronage, a mechanism was needed for restricting the quantity of patronage 
offered to members of  Prior to civil service reform, the only avail- 
able option was for the president to increase or decrease the number of direct 
presidential appointments (appointments therefore beyond congressional con- 
trol). As with members of Congress, however, there were limits on the number 
of appointments that the president could use beneficially. With more individu- 
als to interview and positions to administer, the president would have either to 
invest more time in the process or to delegate responsibility to  other^.^' Such 
delegation of duties would weaken the president’s control over patronage ap- 
pointees and increase the influence of the local party machine. 
The president could not unilaterally  adjust the total  number of patronage 
workers. The size of the federal labor force was determined by programmatic 
legislation passed by Congress and the associated staffing of federal agencies. 
Further, Congress would not support mere reductions in the size of the patron- 
age pool because that would increase the implicit price for patronage paid by 
each member of the Congress. Hence, to obtain congressional support for lim- 
its on the number of patronage workers, Congress had to be offered some form 
of compensation. Improvements in worker productivity offered a potential ba- 
sis for exchange. The president, too, was interested in obtaining a more effi- 
cient workforce and would be a strong supporter of reform efforts both to place 
restrictions on the amount of patronage and to raise productivity. 
One possible solution to the performance problem facing the president and 
members of Congress was to increase the quality of patronage workers by re- 
quiring examinations for those entering federal employment. The allocation of 
jobs through the political spoils system could have remained in place. Civil 
service testing had been adopted earlier in parts of Europe, and there had been 
a number of  efforts to implement entrance exams into the federal workforce 
after the Civil War. Moreover, there is evidence, drawn from evaluations of the 
effects of the Pendleton Act, that testing to screen patronage applicants would 
have improved quality and performance. Accordingly, testing within the pat- 
ronage system could have been a means for improving the quality of govern- 
ment employees and potentially increasing their benefit to members of Con- 
gress and the president. Testing  alone, however, would not have solved the 
monitoring problem of how patronage workers’ time was to be distributed be- 
tween providing regular government services and partisan activities. By con- 
tinuing the practice of hiring the party faithful (even those screened by tests), 
the opportunity remained for the local party machine to divert patronage em- 
ployees from providing the constituent services desired by Congress and the 
president to the parochial activities desired by local politicians. 
When the labor force was small, the costs for federal politicians of managing 
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low. Moreover, voters could have  more easily identified patronage workers 
with a particular federal politician. As a consequence, a vote-maximizing fed- 
eral politician would have had the incentive to assign jobs to those who would 
deliver the most votes by weighing the applicant’s  potential as a local campaign 
worker, source of assessment funds, and provider of government services. 
As the labor force grew, the time costs of monitoring each employee would 
have risen. Further, while members of  Congress had incentives to police the 
provision of local partisan services, their motivation for monitoring the provi- 
sion of general government services would have fallen as government became 
more national in scope and as the size of the patronage pool expanded. The 
actions of  federal workers in one section of  the country were more likely to 
have an effect elsewhere. In addition, a growing federal labor force was more 
anonymous in the eyes of  voters and more difficult to link to any particular 
national politician, except the president. These factors presented an account- 
ability problem between some members of Congress and voters. As we argue 
below, however, voter ire would have been directed toward the president and 
members of Congress from predictable districts. 
In the face of these growing management difficulties, the mere testing of job 
applicants within the prevailing patronage system was unlikely to have  seri- 
ously improved productivity, although the effect would have depended on the 
standards adopted. Moreover, with  a growing demand for federal services, 
there were few means of  limiting the growth of  the labor force. Hence, the 
monitoring problem would have intensified, despite the adoption of merit test- 
ing within patronage. Further, as the numbers of patronage jobs grew, the presi- 
dent would have been under pressure to delegate more of the actual dispensa- 
tion  of  patronage  to  the  very  department heads  who  were  charged  with 
administering exams and selecting new employees. The department heads, in 
turn, would have been subject to the political demands of members of Congress 
and local party officials. This may explain why some of the early attempts to 
use testing within the patronage labor force that predated the Pendleton Act 
did not fare well.38  As a result, merit testing alone was an incomplete solution 
to the problems of allocation, control, and performance of the patronage labor 
force faced by the president and members of  Congress in the post-Civil  War 
period. 
The resolution lay in a new arrangement that involved both testing and re- 
moving targeted positions from patronage. Once dislodged from the spoils sys- 
tem, federal employees would no longer be required to fulfill local party duties. 
Accordingly, the allocation of  federal jobs on the basis of test scores instead 
of patronage considerations would reduce the influence of local party officials 
among federal workers, lower monitoring costs, and increase output as workers 
were able to devote their full attention to the provision of government services. 
If  the problems associated with patronage were to be resolved effectively, leg- 
islators had collectively to institute a politically neutral system for hiring and 
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A decision to support civil service reform involved a trade-off in benefits 
and costs for each politician, and legislators were subjected to different politi- 
cal pressures in this calculation. Certain politicians could secure greater sup- 
port from voters by reducing the number of patronage positions. In particular, 
those politicians most negatively affected by patronage practices would be the 
ones with the greatest incentive to alter the system. Large post offices and 
customhouses were considered to be especially troublesome and were the fo- 
cus of considerable concern in subsequent congressional debate over the Pen- 
dleton Act: “The necessity of the application of the system in smaller offices 
is not so great. The heads of such offices have more leisure, more immediate 
supervision of each subordinate; and the temptation to use their position for 
mere political purposes is not so great. The system can readily be extended at 
any time” (U.S. Senate, “Report,” 1  882).39  Accordingly, we expect that legisla- 
tors from districts with large federal installations would be the most likely to 
support the adoption of a merit system in place of patronage. 
Once a politician decided to support civil service reform, there was still the 
problem of which positions to remove from patronage. Not all patronage jobs 
posed the same costs or offered the same benefits. If they acted judiciously to 
maximize votes, federal politicians would be expected to compare the costs 
and benefits of placing various patronage positions into the new merit system. 
In particular, we expect that rank-and-file  positions in those large federal facili- 
ties subject to voter complaints would be the most likely candidates for place- 
ment under a merit system. The performance of  these positions critically af- 
fected the delivery of federal services, and, because many of the appointments 
were to relatively low-level positions, they provided few political benefits to 
federal politicians as patronage assignments. In  contrast, the more limited 
number of  high-level supervisory and executive positions, such as first-class 
postmasters at the largest post offices, were less directly linked to the local 
party and were patronage plums with high political returns. Hence, we expect 
that these positions would not be given up in the conversion to a merit system. 
In sum, the arguments developed in this section suggest the following impli- 
cations for the initial design of  the new federal labor institution: 
1. The new federal labor arrangement would include both testing and re- 
moval from patronage. 
2.  Not all federal positions would be affected by  the civil service reform, 
and the shift to merit would be gradual. The most likely to be included are 
rank-and-file appointees at large urban post offices and customhouses. High- 
level appointees would remain within the patronage system. 
3. The president would take the lead in promoting civil service reform. 
4.  Members of  Congress from districts with large customhouses and post 
offices would join the president in promoting adoption of the merit system. 
These implications regarding the nature of civil service reform legislation and 
the identity of the politicians who supported it are examined in the following 
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2.5  Legislation for Merit 
2.5.1  Early Efforts to Adopt Merit: The Jenckes Bill 
The most serious early effort in Congress to adopt a merit system for the 
hiring of  federal employees was made by  Congressman Thomas Jenckes of 
Rhode Island.””  The Jenckes bill, which was a prototype for the Pendleton Act, 
called for the use of  competitive examinations for entry into the federal civil 
service for all positions, except those top-level offices named by the president 
and confirmed by  the Senate. The Civil Service Commission was to monitor 
the selection process. In support of his bill, Jenckes argued that introducing a 
merit system would “save congressmen and executive officers countless hours 
wasted listening to office seekers” (Hoogenboom 1968, 28). 
Jenckes was a member of the Joint Select Committee on Retrenchment after 
the Civil War  and also believed that a merit system improving government 
efficiency would allow for a reduction in taxes: “Let us  seek to obtain skill, 
ability, fidelity, zeal, and integrity in the public service, and we  shall not be 
called upon to increase salaries or the number of offices. It is safe to assert that 
the number of offices may be diminished by  one-third, and the efficiency of 
the whole force of the civil service increased by one-half, with a corresponding 
reduction of  salaries for discontinued offices, if a healthy system of appoint- 
ment and discipline be established for its government” (Congressional Globe, 
39th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 838-39). 
Jenckes and other civil service reformers looked to Great Britain, where 
merjt-based reforms were being implemented at the time.41  Indeed, later in 
1879, as the campaign for civil service reform continued, Dorman Eaton of the 
National Civil Service Reform League, the chief architect of  the Pendleton 
Act, wrote The Civil Service in Great Britain (1880) to extol the rewards of 
civil service reforms in Britain and their likely beneficial effects in the United 
States. The book set a British standard for American legislation and linked the 
merit system to progress and patronage to provincialism and inc~mpetence.~~ 
Despite growing support for some type of merit system for federal workers, 
the Jenckes bill would have resulted in massive cuts in the number of patronage 
positions. As the analytic framework in section 2.4 above suggested would be 
the case, the bill’s broad scope was too much for most representatives, and the 
House voted to table the measure in 1867 by  a margin of 72 to 66 (Congres- 
sional Globe, 39th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 1034-36). The vote to table the Jenckes 
bill is instructive because of  the patterns of  support and opposition for civil 
service reform that are revealed. As Ari Hoogenboom noted, “This vote . . . 
was surprisingly close and cut across party lines. Although the bipartisan vote 
reveals no sharp cleavage between political ‘outs’ and ‘ins,’ it does outline an 
urban versus rural pattern. There is an indication of correlation between dis- 
tance from centers of commerce and decrease of interest in civil service re- 
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Jenckes bill, those House members with the large postal and customs facilities 
that were critical for commercial activities would be the most likely to support 
civil service reform. We  examine congressional voting behavior and this hy- 
pothesis in our analysis of the Pendleton Act. 
2.5.2  The Pendleton Act of  1883 
After the failure of the Jenckes bill in 1867, there were various attempts to 
create a merit-based system for hiring federal workers. The Jenckes bill was 
reintroduced in  1868, 1870, and  1871, but it did not pass (see Titlow 1979; 
Van Riper 1958,68-78). Between 1871 and 1874, there was a short-lived Civil 
Service Commission authorized by  a rider to an appropriations bill (16 Stat. 
514 [1871]) and supported by  President Grant.43  The statute authorized the 
president to establish rules and regulations for the hiring of federal workers to 
best  promote the efficiency of  government through the use of  criteria that 
stressed knowledge and ability rather than political ties. It also authorized the 
establishment of a commission to prescribe the functions of the civil service. 
Grant appointed seven members to the committee to initiate merit hiring. They 
drew on the British civil service model to draft rules for competitive examina- 
tions for hiring and promotion. These efforts, however, did not lead to a perma- 
nent federal merit system because Congress refused to continue the appropria- 
tions for the commission’s actions in 1874. 
A permanent institutional structure for merit hiring did not come until the 
Pendleton Act was passed in 1883. The original Pendleton bill was submitted 
to Congress by  Senator George Pendleton of  Ohio in December 1880. It fol- 
lowed the earlier Jenckes bill, creating a strong Civil Service Commission to 
administer a merit system. Some constitutional issues were raised, and the bill 
was withdrawn and replaced by one carrying provisions drafted by members of 
the New York Civil Service Reform Association and the National Civil Service 
Reform League (Sageser 1935,37-40; Skowronek 1982,64-66). The new bill 
was reintroduced by Pendleton on 10 January 188  1, and hearings were held by 
the Committee to Examine the Several Branches of the Civil Service. Although 
the committee recommended passage, no action was  taken by  the Congress 
during that session. Action awaited the new president (Sageser 1935, 40-41; 
Titlow 1979). 
The assassination of President Garfield in July 188  1 reignited the spoils sys- 
tem as an explosive campaign issue. The New York Civil Service Reform As- 
sociation took advantage of  public revulsion over the assassination to cam- 
paign for passage of  the Pendleton Act, and the legislation was reintroduced 
by Pendleton on 6 December 1881 (Sageser 1935,42-44;  Titlow 1979). Con- 
gressional debate emphasized the efficiency and economy that would come 
about with a merit system and broad public demand for civil service reform. 
Even so, no action was taken on the bill. During the summer of  1882, reform 
groups continued to lobby Congress and generate voter support for enacting 
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Although political pressure was building for the adoption of  some type of 
merit reform legislation, shifts in the political fortunes of the two parties help 
explain the exact timing of the passage of the Pendleton Act in  1883. Demo- 
crats took control of the House in March 1883, and Republicans began to fear 
that they would lose the 1884 presidential election and therefore lose control 
of  the White House for the first time since the election of  Lincoln. Federal 
patronage and assessments, especially by the Republican Congressional Com- 
mittee, were central campaign issues in the fall 1882 congressional elections, 
and politicians were looking to introduce the kinds of reforms outlined in the 
Pendleton  There was considerable political posturing occasioned by the 
bill. For Republicans, who stood to lose the 1884 presidential election, enact- 
ment of the law would mean that the Democrats would have fewer patronage 
positions from which to obtain political assessments. 
The Pendleton bill also allowed for existing employees to be placed within 
the classified service. This facet of the bill did not go unnoticed by some Dem- 
ocrats. Senator Joseph Brown of Georgia suggested that the preamble of  the 
bill state “a bill to perpetuate in office the Republicans who now control the 
patronage of the government” (Congressional Record, 47th Cong., 2d sess., p. 
661). Many Democrats, however, were caught in a dilemma. Failure to vote 
for merit reform would cast them as being in favor of maintaining the system 
of  spoils and allow Republicans the benefits of political assessments for the 
upcoming  1884 elections. Although assessments were  becoming  less  im- 
portant as a source of  campaign revenues, Democrats also wanted to curtail 
Republican access to them. Nevertheless, they also sensed that victory and 
control of  patronage were close at hand. These issues weighed in the voting 
decision faced by each member of Congress. 
The debate in the Senate over the Pendleton Act occurred over the period 
from 12 December to 27 December 1882, when it was passed by the Senate; 
the House vote took place on 4 January 1883.45  The bill was voted on during 
the lame-duck second session of the Forty-seventh Congress, which was con- 
trolled by the Republicans. It provoked considerable debate in the Senate. For 
example, Senator Warner Miller of New York argued, “No party can hope to 
manage the patronage of this government in its present magnitude and main- 
tain itself before the people. The people demand efficiency in the officers. 
They only ask of the Post-Office Department that it shall take their mails and 
that it shall deliver them in the least possible time with the fewest possible 
mistakes” (Congressional Record, 47th Cong., 2d sess., p. 284). 
One of the major objectives of the Pendleton bill was the separation of fed- 
eral employees into two groups: classified (merit) and unclassified (patronage). 
As predicted, not all federal employees were placed within the merit service. 
When the law was implemented, 2,573 positions were placed in the classified 
customs service, 5,699 in the classified postal service, and 5,652 in the classi- 
fied departmental service in Washington, D.C. (US. Civil Service Commis- 33  Replacing Political Patronage with Merit 
sion, Annual Report, 1889, 15). Senior officials, appointed by  the president 
with the advice and consent of  the Senate, were not covered by  the act, nor 
were other positions not specifically designated by the law. Although the Pen- 
dleton Act affected only 13,924 positions out of a civilian labor force of some 
13  1,860, it authorized the president to include additional positions through 
executive order (U.S. Civil Service Commission, Annual Report, 1889, 15). 
Unclassified positions remained to be filled via traditional patronage appoint- 
ments. 
Sections 1-3  of the Pendleton Act authorized the establishment of  a Civil 
Service Commission of three persons, appointed by the president, to draw up 
rules for the administration and enforcement of  a merit system. Competitive 
examinations were to be  implemented for filling offices and for promotion 
within the classified service. Section 4 stated that the classified service was to 
include those clerks in customhouses employing fifty or more persons, clerks 
in post offices of fifty or more, and executive branch offices in Washington, 
D.C. (sec. 2) (47th Cong., 2d sess., 1883, chap. 27, p. 403). Additionally, the 
law called for the inclusion of the employees of any post office or customhouse 
once total employment reached fifty. 
By construction, then, the Pendleton Act’s provisions focused on large cus- 
tomhouses and post offices in the principal centers of business, commerce, and 
industry, where most federal services were directed. The cities affected were 
Albany, Baltimore, Boston, Brooklyn, Burlington, Buffalo, Chicago, Cincin- 
nati,  Cleveland, Detroit, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Louisville, Milwaukee, 
Newark, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Port Huron, Mich- 
igan, Portlaqd, Providence, Rochester, St. Louis, San Francisco, and Washing- 
ton, D.C. (U.S. Civil Service Commission, Annual Report, 1884, 42-46).  By 
targeting the largest customhouses and post offices, the Pendleton Act could 
place employees under a merit system to improve their performance and re- 
spond to the demands of  business and reform groups (Hoogenboom  1968, 
179-97; Skowronek 1982,72). 
The delivery of  federal services through comparatively large facilities in 
major urban areas is reflected in postal and customs data. Postal workers ac- 
counted for 56 percent of all federal employees in 188  1, and the cities covered 
by the Pendleton Act had 2,746 post carriers, 71 percent of all postal carriers 
in the postal service (U.S. Department of  Commerce 1975, 1103; U.S. Post 
Office Department, Annual Report, 1884, 86). Per capita postal expenditures 
also tended to be highest in the most populous states. In New  York, for ex- 
ample, per capita expenditure was $2.40 in  1900 (when data are available), 
almost six times that for South Carolina. In addition, the nine populous North 
Atlantic states had per capita expenditures of  at least $1.40, while no rural 
South Central state had an expenditure greater than $0.73 (U.S. Post Office 
Department, Annual Report, 1900, 810). Similarly, of  the eleven cities with 
customhouses covered by  the Pendleton Act, all but three were  among the 34  Chapter2 
twenty largest cities in the country in 1880, and they had 3,393 customs em- 
ployees, 83  percent of all federal customs employees (U.S. Civil Service Com- 
mission, Annual Report, 1893-94,  132). 
The clerical positions in Washington, D.C., placed under the departmental 
service affected  more technical  functions of  government, such as  surveys, 
where the use of examinations was more likely to result in the selection of 
higher-quality employees and promote the goal of achieving administrative ef- 
fi~iency.~~  Moreover, these positions were located in the nation’s capital. Hence, 
it is unlikely that these employees were of much use as campaign workers 
for either members of  Congress or local party officials. Appointments to the 
departmental service were to be apportioned among the citizens of the various 
states, according to population. 
Besides addressing the concerns of voters in commercial centers about the 
efficiency of federal patronage workers in the post offices and customhouses, 
the act also took aim at reducing the potential for overt competition for control 
of classified federal workers by making them less attractive targets. The strong- 
est language in the bill and its only explicit penalties were directed toward 
prohibiting the levying of political assessments. Moreover, threats of discharge 
were not to be used in soliciting funds.‘“ 
There is evidence that the reforms introduced by  the Pendleton  Act im- 
proved the performance of federal workers in the positions that were covered 
by the law. The merit exams called for by the Pendleton Act addressed issues 
necessary  for performing  particular  tasks,  and,  importantly,  not  everyone 
passed. Applicants for most clerkships and nontechnical positions were tested 
for ,“common school” proficiency. Technical positions, such as engineers, ar- 
chitects, telegraphers, and accountants, required more specialized exams. Be- 
tween July  1883 and January  1884, 3,542 applicants were examined by  the 
commission, and 2,044, or 58 percent, received the required 65 percent passing 
rate (U.S. Civil Service Commission, Annual Report, 1884,67). Between 1884 
and 1885, 6,347 individuals were examined, and 4,141, or 65 percent passed 
(U.S. Civil Service Commission, Annual Report, 1885, 7). Data for assessing 
the productivity gains of testing under the merit system are limited to qualita- 
tive evidence, but they indicate a pattern of change. Although the Civil Service 
Commission that administered exams and employee hiring was not a disinter- 
ested party, it reported extensive productivity improvements after 1883. In its 
annual reports, testimonials were presented from postmasters and customs col- 
lectors regarding improvements in the functioning of their agencies with merit 
employees (U.S.  Civil Service Commission, Annual Reports, 1884,32-39,  and 
1885, 38). In its  1899 report (p.  17), the commission outlined increases in 
efficiency through extension of the classified service in the Treasury and Post 
Office Departments. In his analysis of the early years of the federal merit sys- 
tem, Carl Fish (1905, 232) estimated that $2 million was saved annually in the 
collection of customs. 
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members absent (Congressional Record, 47th Cong., 2d sess., p. 661). The yea 
votes were provided by  twenty-three  Republicans,  fourteen Democrats, and 
one independent. All five of the nays came from Democrats, four of  whom 
were from the South. In the House, the bill was approved with a vote of 155 to 
47, with eighty-seven members not voting (Congressional Record, 47th Cong., 
2d sess., p. 867). The votes in favor were cast by  102 Republicans, forty-nine 
Democrats, and four independents. Negative votes were cast by seven Republi- 
cans, thirty-nine Democrats, and one inde~endent.~~ 
Although the vote on the Pendleton Act reveals a break along party lines, 
our analysis suggests that there was more to the story than partisan politics. 
After all, Senator George Pendleton was a Democrat from Ohio, and a majority 
of the Democrats who voted on the bill supported it. Moreover, willingness 
to support reform was particularly strong among members who represented a 
locality with a large post office or customhouse in the vicinity. Indeed, of the 
thirty-six members of the House who had such a federal establishment in their 
district and who voted on the bill, thirty-five voted in favor. Of the thirty-six, 
twenty-one were Republicans and fifteen Democrats. The one negative vote in 
that group, however, was cast by a Democrat. 
It is possible to examine more formally whether those members of the House 
of Representatives from major commercial centers were most likely to support 
the Pendleton Act as well as to examine the effects of party membership and 
other factors. Table 2.3 offers results obtained by applying a logit model to the 
votes registered in the House on the Pendleton Act. In‘addition to the official 
vote count reported above, we augmented the data set by including information 
on pairings ,and stated positions of seven additional representatives who did 
not formally  Inclusion or exclusion of these seven additional votes does 
not alter our findings. Affirmative votes were set equal to unity and negative 
votes equal to zero. The explanatory variables are all qualitative. The first vari- 
able in the table accounts for the presence of a large post office or customhouse 
in the legislator’s district or its immediate vicinity. As we noted earlier, the 
largest post offices and customhouses were in ares where complaints about 
the performance of the patronage system were the most intense. The next two 
variables identify the representative’s party; the excluded category is Republi- 
can. The fourth variable is an interaction term and equals unity if the represen- 
tative is both a Democrat and from the South. Our rationale here is that the 
South was largely rural at the time and that the provision of federal services 
was therefore relatively limited there. 
The results of the logit analysis of the congressional vote on the Pendleton 
Act shown in equation (1) of table 2.3 indicate that the presence of  a large 
post office or customhouse significantly (at the 5 percent level) increased the 
probability of  voting in favor of the bill.50  However, since most Republicans 
voted in favor of  the act, the marginal effect of the presence of  a large post 
office or customhouse on the probability of that group voting in favor is rela- 
tively small. Using the coefficients reported in equation (l), the marginal in- 36  Chapter2 
Table 2.3  Logit  Analysis of the House of Representatives Vote on the 
Pendleton Act 
Variable 
Eq. (1):  Eq. (2):  Eq. (3): 
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Source: The vote is listed in the Congressional Record, 47th Cong., 2d sess., 1882, p. 867. Party 
affiliation and election data are from the Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to U.S. Elections (1985) 
and the Biographical Directory of  the United States Congress: 1774-1989  (1989). 
Note: For discussion of the variables, see the text. Asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses. 
crease in the probability for that group is only .06.51  For Northern Democrats, 
the marginal increase is substantially greater, .23, and for Southern Democrats 
it is S1. This reinforces the argument regarding the importance of being from 
a district with a large federal installation in determining the position of a mem- 
ber of Congress on merit hiring, and it also shows that Southern Democrats, 
who represented mostly rural areas where there were no such facilities, were 
less likely to support the adoption of a merit system. 
Equation (2) in table 2.3 examines a competing explanation for the shift to 
merit. A popular argument is that civil service reform came about only as those 
who favored  spoils were driven  from office.52  If  lame-duck representatives 
were mainly spoilsmen being driven from office, then we should expect them 
to have voted against the Pendleton Act. Hence, a fifth variable, set equal to 
unity if the representative either had lost or did not run for reelection in 1882, 
is included to test for any inordinate influence that may have been exerted by 
lame-duck representatives. In addition, if spoils were the currency of the “old 
guard,” then it is plausible that members of Congress with longer periods of 
service would be more likely to oppose the act. Accordingly, a sixth variable 37  Replacing Political Patronage with Merit 
measuring the number of years served in the House by each member was also 
included. The results reported in equation (2) of the table indicate that the votes 
of lame-duck representatives were not systematically different from those who 
had been successfully reelected to office. Nor is the coefficient for the time- 
in-office variable significantly different from zero. Accordingly, our results do 
not support the argument that reform came about as those who favored spoils 
were driven from office.53 
Next,  we  consider whether  absenteeism played  a significant role  in  de- 
termining the pattern of votes cast on the Pendleton Act. In general, absentee- 
ism was relatively high during the 18OOs, and self-selection may have biased 
the results reported in equations (1) and (2). Equation (3) of the table examines 
congressional members’ participation in the Pendleton Act vote using the same 
list of variables shown for equation (2). The dependent variable is assigned the 
value one if  the member voted and zero otherwise. The results indicate that 
only the coefficient on the lame-duck variable is statistically significant at the 
5 percent level. While this yields an  interesting interpretation in that lame- 
duck status appears to induce shirking, the coefficient on that same variable 
was not statistically significant in equation (2).54  Accordingly, the results re- 
ported in table 2.3 (eq. [l]  and [2]) do not appear to be systematically biased 
because of ab~enteeisrn.~~ 
2.6  Summary 
In this chapter, we have  argued that, within the context of  changing eco- 
nomic and political conditions in the United States in the late nineteenth cen- 
tury, both the president and certain members of  Congress had incentives to 
replace patronage with merit considerations for staffing federal positions. With 
the growth in the activities of  the federal government in the post-Civil War 
period, its performance became of  greater consequence for business profit- 
ability, and politicians came under pressure from business groups to provide 
government services more effectively than was possible under patronage. At 
the same time, it was becoming increasingly costly for federal politicians to 
control and benefit from a growing number of patronage employees. The prob- 
lems of managing a growing federal labor force occurred within the context of 
a widening split between the local political party apparatus, which depended 
more on patronage, and national politicians, who faced broader interest-group 
demands for efficiency and who relied more on interest-group contributions to 
finance campaigns. 
Our argument that the difficulties of administering a large patronage labor 
force were the major factors in the adoption of  merit reform by  the federal 
government is supported by similar efforts in certain states and cities. Indeed, 
the most populous states and cities with the largest government labor forces 
were the first to adopt merit employment rules. This pattern of  civil service 
reform across jurisdictions with large numbers of patronage workers suggests 38  Chapter2 
that there were fundamental problems of labor management that required new 
institutional innovations at the federal, state, and local level. These issues have 
not been identified in the existing literature on the adoption of the merit sys- 
tem; hence, standard explanations miss the character of the real reforms that 
were made by federal politicians in 1883. 
For example, the most common explanation is that moral outrage among 
civic-minded groups against the corruption and inefficiency inherent in patron- 
age forced unwilling congressional politicians to replace patronage with merit 
hiring (Van Riper  1958; Hoogenboom  1968). Although there was concern in 
the country over the corruption and inefficiency of the patronage system, this 
interpretation focuses too much on external factors and neglects the incentives 
that vote-maximizing politicians had to replace a system of employment that 
we argue was increasingly costly and no longer capable of winning electoral 
support. But, even more important, the preoccupation with the actions of re- 
form groups diverts attention from the underlying question of whether the pat- 
ronage institution could serve politicians effectively when the government la- 
bor force became very large. 
Another common explanation for the adoption of  the merit system is that 
clever politicians devised the civil service system in order to “blanket in” or 
tenure their appointees and thus protect them from removal following adverse 
electoral results  (U.S. House of Representatives  1976, 182). In this way,  in- 
cumbent politicians could constrain their political competitors’ access to pat- 
ronage. This interpretation is a more cynical view of  the shift to merit,  sug- 
gesting that partisan  motives  remained dominant  and that little real  reform 
occurred in the organization and use of federal employees. We also find this 
expianation to be incomplete. First of all, it does not explain why civil service 
reform occurred when it did. Politicians would always have wanted to deny 
their competitors the benefits of  the spoils. There is no obvious reason why 
this desire would have intensified in the late nineteenth century. Moreover, the 
notion that the merit service was established to protect incumbents does not fit 
the historical circumstances surrounding the enactment of the Pendleton Act. 
The Pendleton  Act did not provide job tenure. As we discuss in chapter 3, 
provisions for substantial job security were added gradually over the late nine- 
teenth and early twentieth centuries. After the Pendleton Act was passed, clas- 
sified employees remained vulnerable to removal (and some were removed) as 
administrations changed. We examine the issue of tenure and additions to the 
merit system made by lame-duck politicians, those most likely to want to pro- 
tect their appointees, in chapter 3. As a preview, we find that actions to place 
patronage workers into the merit service when their benefactors were leaving 
office accounted for much less of the growth of the civil service system than 
is argued in the historical literature. 
There have been other explanations for the shift to merit employment that 
emphasize the concerns of vote-maximizing politicians, notably the work by 
Joe Reid and Michael Kurth (1988, 1989), Jack Knott and Gary Miller (1  987), 39  Replacing Political Patronage with Merit 
and Murray Horn (1988), but, by neglecting the patronage management prob- 
lems that we stress, these analyses do not satisfactorily address the nature or 
timing of federal civil service reform. Reid and Kurth point to a decline in the 
derived demand for patronage workers as urban voters became more affluent 
and more homogeneous in the late nineteenth century. According to those au- 
thors, as this occurred, politicians shifted their demand from the particularistic 
government services provided through patronage to broader public goods bet- 
ter provided  by merit employees. These demand shifts helped bring about a 
decline of the urban machine. Knott and Miller argue that reformers wanted 
efficiency and accountability for federal workers and that those demands led 
to conflict between reformers, who advocated the science of administration, 
and supporters of the local party machine. Horn places no emphasis on chang- 
ing voter demands or desires for better  performance;  rather, he asserts that 
politicians desired a labor force that would be less vulnerable to political ma- 
nipulation  and  legislative  opportunism  than  were  patronage  workers.  Ac- 
cording to Horn, protection from removal and a rigid salary structure for bu- 
reaucrats were added to increase the durability of legislative agreements. With 
a civil service system, federal politicians would be less able to pressure federal 
workers to alter legislated policy in order to provide more favorable treatment 
to their constituents. 
Two additional factors might be considered as contributing to the shift from 
patronage  to merit. One, discussed by  Charles  Stewart  (1989, 68-70),  is a 
change in the fiscal position of the federal government. With an expanded role 
for the government in the late nineteenth century, expenditures grew, increas- 
ing the stringency of budget constraints. With the specter of federal deficits, 
reform movements from both within and outside government emerged to make 
it more efficient,  and this process encouraged the professionalization  of the 
bureaucracy under the merit system.56  The other factor is an alleged rise in 
pork barrel exchanges, as an alternative mechanism to patronage, for fashion- 
ing agreements and coalitions between the president and the Congress. As pork 
barrel expenditures to specific districts grew (mostly river and harbor legisla- 
tion and water projects), the reliance on patronage exchanges to forge congres- 
sional agreements may have declined. Hence, Congress would have become 
more willing to scrap patronage.” 
We agree with the focus of the various studies summarized above, which is 
directed toward the rational decisions of  politicians in weighing the relative 
benefits and costs of patronage and merit. Further, we are in agreement that 
the benefits  of patronage were declining as compared to its costs for many 
federal politicians in the late nineteenth century. What is missing in these stud- 
ies, however, is sufficient attention to the problems of control resulting from 
the growth in size of the federal labor force after the Civil War. Absent these 
management problems, shifts in demand for government services could have 
been handled by patronage appointees who passed proficiency  tests, leaving 
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address the origins of the federal civil service system. As we point out, tenure 
and standard salary legislation came later; they were not part of the Pendleton 
Act. Moreover, his analysis does not address why political opportunism be- 
came a particular problem in 1883 and not earlier. 
With regard to federal deficits, federal government receipts exceeded expen- 
ditures for twenty-seven years, from 1866 through  1893. Shortfalls occurred 
from 1894 through 1899, followed by  surpluses through 1903  and then by short 
periods of deficit and surplus through 1917 and the start of World War  I.58 As 
noted by  Stewart (1989,70), concern over the better management of the federal 
budget led to the establishment of the Keep Committee by President Roosevelt 
in 1905 and the Taft Commission on Economy and Efficiency in 1912. But the 
rise of federal budget deficits and efforts to address them came much later than 
did the desire of  the president and members of  Congress to replace at least 
some of the spoils system with limited merit protections. The Jenckes bill pro- 
posing the establishment of a merit service was voted on in 1867 and again in 
1870, and President Grant appointed the first Civil Service Commission in 
1870 (U.S. House of Representatives 1976, 132-39). Civil service reform re- 
mained a perennial issue in political campaigns and in the federal government 
through 1883 and the Pendleton Act. All this activity, however, occurred during 
a period of unprecedented government surpluses, and even the enactment of 
the Pendleton Act predated by eleven years the rise of any federal budget defi- 
cits. Accordingly, federal deficits do not explain the initiation of  the merit 
system. 
Similarly, pork barrel exchanges may have become an alternative to patron- 
age as a means of constructing political coalitions in Congress, but there is no 
cleaf pattern for explaining the shift from patronage to merit in the late nine- 
teenth century. As described by Stewart (1989,67), major pork barrel expendi- 
tures, such as river and harbor appropriations, did not grow as a share of the 
federal budget in the post-Civil  War period, which was also a time of relatively 
stationary federal budgets (see also U.S.  Department of  Commerce  1975, 
1104; Wilson 1986,735). 
By  contrast, as we have  documented in  table 2.1, the federal government 
labor force grew by over 96 percent between 1871 and 1881 alone. Our empha- 
sis on the growth of  the federal labor force as a key  element in the shift to 
merit highlights the labor management problems that arise when organization 
size increases. Moreover, this focus on the problems associated with the size 
of the patronage labor force offers an explanation for the timing of civil service 
reform, the identity of the constituent groups most interested in replacing pat- 
ronage, the characteristics of  the politicians most likely to be responsive to 
these concerns, and the specific attributes of the merit system created by the 
Pendleton Act. 
The problems of administering an increasing number of patronage workers 
were clearly recognized by federal politicians. For example, the first page of 
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In  the beginning, even so late as 1801, there were 906 post-offices; now 
there are 44,848. Then there were 69 customs-houses; now there are 135. 
Then the revenues were less than $3,000,000; now they are $400,000,000. 
Then our ministers to foreign countries were 4; now they are 33. Then our 
consuls were 63; now they are 728. Then less than  1,000 men sufficed to 
administer the government; now more than 100,000 are needed. Then one 
man might personally know, appoint on their merits, supervise the perfor- 
mance of their duties, and for sufficient cause remove all the officers; now 
no single human being, however great his intelligence, discrimination, in- 
dustry, endurance, devotion, even if relieved of every other duty, can possi- 
bly, unaided, select and retain in official station those best fitted to discharge 
the many and varied and delicate functions of the government. (U.S. Senate, 
“Report,” 1882, I) 
To conclude, we have argued that the president would take a leading role in 
promoting the adoption of merit employment and in constraining the growth 
of the patronage labor force. This is an issue that we examine in more detail in 
the following chapter. We analyze how competition among the president and 
members of  Congress for control of the new merit labor force led to the adop- 
tion of additional refinements in the civil service system. 
It is worthwhile noting at this point, however, that the Pendleton Act seems 
to have assisted the president in weakening the hold of the local machine on 
members of Congress and in strengthening national party unity. One measure 
of party cohesion is the proportion of roll-call votes decided along party lines, 
whereby the majority of Democratic members voted against a majority of the 
Republicans. This party-unity measure rose in the late nineteenth century with 
the rise of national party structures. For the Fiftieth Congress (1887-88),  the 
party unity measure was 5 1.1 percent. It peaked during the Fifty-eighth Con- 
gress (1903-4)  at 89.7 percent (Brady, Cooper, and Hurley 1979,384). These 
figures suggest that constraining the volume of patronage, especially for low- 
level positions, not only reduced the influence of the local machine but likely 
increased  the president’s ability  to discipline members  of  Congress to vote 
along party lines. By effectively controlling the quantity of patronage, the pres- 
ident would be able to increase the commitments (price) received in exchange 
from Congress. In essence, the Pendleton Act appears to have increased the 
president’s ability to exercise market power. 
Notes 
1. Although there are restrictions, the U.S. Constitution (art.  2, sec. 2) vests the 
power to appoint officers in the president (see also Van Riper 1958, 13-16). 
2. Although the Pendleton Act and various executive orders forbade certain political 
activities by  federal employees, it is the  1939 Hatch Act (53 Stat. 1147) that is most 
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ees and how it relates to the concept of political neutrality are discussed in chap. 3 of 
this volume. 
3. Two key  works that adopt this view  are Van  Riper (1958) and Hoogenboom 
(  1968). 
4. We have only indirect evidence on the relative salary levels of federal patronage 
employees in the nineteenth century As we discuss in chap. 4, there is considerable 
discussion about the deterioration in the real federal wage after 1883 and enactment of 
the Pendleton Act and a rise in voluntary separations (see Commons 1935, 70); Spero 
1927, 33, 96; and Conyngton 1920). In chap. 4, we argue that, once politicians could 
no longer extract assessment payments, their interest in maintaining a relatively higher 
federal salary waned. 
5. Fowler notes that the postmaster general was also involved in the collection of 
assessments from postal employees. For Andrew Johnson’s election, the postmaster gen- 
eral stated, “They are going to tax the clerks in the New York post office on the 3  1  st of 
this month for Political purposes,  1/2 per cent on salaries over $1,000 and  1 per cent 
on smaller Sums” (Fowler 1943, 140). 
6. For discussions of patronage and its central role in American politics, particularly 
for the local party, see Fish (1905), Fowler (1943), Skowronek (1982), Hoogenboom 
(1968), and Van Riper (1958). 
7. Wilson (1961) describes the role played by  patronage in machine politics. His 
description applies equally well to federal patronage in the nineteenth century. 
8. The use of patronage as a medium of negotiation between the president and mem- 
bers of Congress is noted by Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987, 16). 
9. Members of Congress were, of  course, disgruntled by  a president’s refusal to 
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comments on dealing with members of Congress (U.S. House of Representatives 1976, 
90). Were members of Congress given the exclusive right to appoint even lower-level 
positions in their states or districts, the power of the president to use patronage in ex- 
change for votes would be destroyed. 
10. Customs duties were 95 percent of  total government receipts in  1861 and 56 
percent in 1891. 
11. US.  House of Representatives (1976, 156). This publication contains numerous 
complaints, especially those of presidents, about the time required of them for the allo- 
cation of patronage. 
12. For discussion, see Skowronek (1982, 57-60). 
13. Agency problems arose in a manner similar to that described in a firm context 
14. Fowler (1943, 146). For discussion of the growing concern about the corruption 
by Ross (1973), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Williamson (1985). 
and efficiency of patronage  employees, see Greenstein  (1964) and Griffith (1974a, 
1974b). 
15. For discussion of the first Civil Service Commission, see Van Riper (1958, 68- 
71); U.S. Civil Service Commission, Annual Report  (1884,  13); and Sageser (1935, 
16. See Williamson (1967, 1970, and 1985). Issues of  organization size and control 
are discussed by Ouchi (1977). 
17. Council of State Governments (1942,223-25);  see also US.  Department of Com- 
merce (1975, 26-37).  The most populous states that did not have civil service rules 
were Pennsylvania (second), Texas (sixth), and Missouri (tenth). 
18. Other discussions of the pattern of adoption of civil service rules by states are in 
Faught (1915) and Tolbert and Zucker (1983, 28). Of the thirteen less populous states 
with civil service rules by  1941, ten adopted them between 1937 and 1941 in response 
to pressure from the federal government as a condition for receiving certain New Deal 
aid programs: Indiana, Tennessee, Alabama, Minnesota, Louisiana, Kansas, Connecti- 
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cut, Rhode Island, New Mexico, and Maine. States adopting civil service rules earlier 
were Wisconsin (1905), Maryland (1921), and Colorado (1907). Less populous states 
with no civil service regulations by  1941, ranked by  1940 population, included North 
Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, Virginia, Iowa, Oklahoma, Mississippi, Arkansas, West 
Virginia, South Carolina, Florida, Washington, Nebraska, Oregon, South Dakota, North 
Dakota, Montana, Utah, Idaho, Arizona, New Hampshire, Vermont, Delaware, Wyo- 
ming, and Nevada. 
19. Ridley and Nolting (1941,  128-52).  This does not include Washington, D.C., 
which was governed differently-through  federal legislation. The early adoption of 
merit rules by larger cities follows the pattern for state governments, with smaller cities 
adopting civil service later. Many smaller urban areas adopted merit reforms in re- 
sponse to New Deal requirements between  1930 and  1940. Also, the percentage of 
cities with no civil service system increases as size declines. Among the smaller cities 
in the size category 25,000-50,000,  37 percent had no merit system by  1941. In an 
examination of the characteristics of cities that adopted civil service coverage for their 
employees, using 1963 Municipal Year Book data, Wolfinger and Field (1966, 321-22) 
find a strong positive relation between a city’s size and the likelihood that its municipal 
employees will be under civil service rules. 
20. Wiebe (1967, 4-5)  and Griffith (1974a, 15, 98, 269-70)  argue that civil service 
reform spread from the federal government to the major cities, where patronage was 
associated with corruption and inefficiency. The call for greater efficiency was at the 
center of urban reform efforts between 1870 and 1900. Competition among cities re- 
quired greater efficiency than that which could be provided through patronage-lower 
taxes, better services, professional police and fire protection, sanitation, and transit ser- 
vices. The efforts of early reformers to improve government efficiency through the re- 
moval of bosses, machines, and patronage is discussed by Greenstein (1964). Tolbert 
and Zucker (1983, 23) summarize other reasons for the adoption of  civil service re- 
forms. 
21.  There  was  well-developed  trade  among  the  regions,  as  described  by  North 
(1961). Nevertheless, the post-Civil War period was one of gradual integration of re- 
gional economies. For discussion, see Davis (1971) and Snowden (1990). 
22. Kolbe (1985, 16) describes how local areas tended to be dominated by single 
parties, whose organization catered to the special interests of that region. 
23. For discussion, see Higgs (1971), James (1983), and Atack (1985). 
24. For discussion, see Libecap (1992) and Gilligan, Marshall, and Weingast (1989). 
Kolbe (1985, 44-56)  claims that, prior to the Civil War, the dominant political class 
was made up of small, independent farmers, to whom the parties catered. After the 
Civil War, business entrepreneurs became the dominant class, and their interests con- 
trolled the Republican party and politics during the period 1864-96. 
25. Shepsle and Weingast (1984) develop a model that emphasizes the geographic 
basis of  political representation. From that they argue that the parochial interests of 
individual legislators will lead them to support policies that concentrate benefits in their 
districts and that make costs more general. This is the type of  problem increasingly 
faced by  the president and members of Congress as their interests began to diverge 
from those of the local party machine (see also McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989). 
26. For discussion of the shift to more national political parties in the late nineteenth 
century, see also Stewart (1989, 60). 
27. See Alexander (1971), Overacker (1932), and Thayer (1973). Overacker (1932, 
32, 71) provides a discussion of the rise in importance of alternative sources of cam- 
paign funds. Similarly, Alexander (197 1,3382-86) describes the cultivation and collec- 
tion of funds from various business groups by the Finance Committees of the Demo- 
cratic and Republican parties in the late nineteenth century. 
28. Rusk (1974, 1029-35) discusses the adoption of the Australian ballot and regis- 44  Chapter2 
tration reform. Prior to the  secret ballot, parties printed ballots, distributed them to 
voters, and monitored the results. This allowed them to ensure that the party faithful 
voted as they were instructed. With the secret ballot, however, whereby neutral ballots 
were provided by the government and voting was private, parties could no longer police 
voting behavior as effectively. The urban states that were in the forefront of federal civil 
service reform were also the leaders in the adoption of the Australian ballot (see also 
Rusk 1970; and Walker 1969). 
29. The growing pressure by  interest groups on the federal government to provide 
services of various kinds is described by Becker (1982) and Kolko (1963). Skowronek 
(1  982,47) views civil service reform as a hallmark of the modern state, where govern- 
ment employees have tenure, are politically neutral, are hired on the basis of merit, and 
operate under uniform rules for promotion, discipline, and remuneration. 
30. For discussion, see Van Riper (1958,78-92). 
31. Although some researchers have argued that ideology is a major factor in roll- 
call voting, Peltzman’s (1984) results indicate that the characteristics of a legislator’s 
constituents, plus campaign contributions, explain roll-call voting behavior. The link 
between constituent interests and roll-call voting is also made by Fiorina (1974, 1-43) 
and Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987, 3). 
32. See, e.g., Mayhew (1974a), Mueller (1989, 207), and Fiorina (1974, 35). Al- 
though reelection may not be the objective of every politician, as we show in the text, 
most members of  the House in the late nineteenth century did seek reelection. The 
desire to obtain popular support or approval from their respective constituencies can 
induce elected officials to behave as if they were vote maximizers, seeking reelection. 
In support of this characterization of legislator and voter behavior, we note that there is 
empirical evidence indicating that, even in their last terms in office, members of Con- 
gress who have announced their pending retirement do not significantly alter their vo- 
ting record (Lott and Bronars 1993). 
33. For discussion of the professionalization of Congress, see Polsby (1968), who 
examines the rise of incumbency in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1789 to 
1965, and Garand and Gross (1984), who extend the analysis through  1980. Mayhew 
(1974b), Fiorina (1977), Ferejohn (1977), and Hibbing (1991), among others, examine 
the rise in reelection rates in the twentieth century. Stewart (1989, 53-63)  argues that 
reelection was a motivation for late nineteenth-century politicians. 
34. The Biographical Directory of  the American Congress, 1774-1971  (197 I, 218- 
22) lists those members of the House who were incumbents in December 1880, and the 
Congressional Quarterly> Guide to U.S. Elections (1985, 798-801)  lists election re- 
sults for 1880. It is possible to match those who ran in the election with their status in 
the House to determine who sought reelection. Of the 217 who sought reelection, 188 
were reelected. Of the remaining  105 members, seventy-six did not run, and twenty- 
nine were defeated. With 293 members, the turnover rate was 35.84 percent. A similar 
procedure, using the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress: 1774-1 989 
(1989,215-22)  and the Guide to US.  Elections (1985,802-5),  indicates that 179 mem- 
bers sought reelection in 1882. This is 61 percent of the original 293 members of the 
House. (After the  1880 census, thirty-two seats were added for the incoming Forty- 
eighth Congress in 1883.) Of those 179, 135 were successful, and forty-four lost (114 
did not seek reelection), giving a turnover rate for the original 293 seats of 53.9 percent. 
35. Some senators, such as Roscoe Conkling of New York, were heavily dependent 
on the local party for support and were noted as spoilsmen (Van Riper 1958, 76). As 
we will show, others, like Senator Warren Miller, also of New York, recognized the 
problems of patronage for the electoral success of their party. 
36. With the continued growth of the patronage pool, the president would eventually 
be faced with a problem similar to that portrayed by Coase (1972). In his example, a 45  Replacing Political Patronage with Merit 
monopolist is interested in finding a credible way to reduce the total stock of a durable 
good in order to assure that the quantity transacted maximizes total revenue. Coase 
assumes that a single individual owns a substantial block of land, e.g., all the land in 
the United States. Given a negatively sloped demand curve, the owner would maximize 
sales revenues where marginal revenue was equal to zero. But, if  the stock of land 
exceeds the quantity at which marginal revenue was equal to zero, the owner would be 
confronted with the problem of trying to remove part of the stock from the marketplace, 
else the price will fall to the competitive level. Coase suggests that one possible way to 
accomplish this is for the owner to donate the “excess” land to the government, desig- 
nating it for some restricted use. His basic message is that it is difficult to restrict the 
quantity sold, especially when one is dealing with a given stock. Where the monopolist 
has complete control over the output of a durable good, it is unlikely that the price will 
fall to the competitive level (see Bagnoli, Salant, and Swierzbinski 1989). 
37. See, e.g., Van  Riper’s (1958, 232-33)  account of President Wilson’s efforts to 
manage patronage appointments in the postal service personally. Wilson quickly dis- 
covered the enormity of the task and ended up delegating the selection process. 
38. U.S. House of Representatives (1976, 106) notes numerous complaints about the 
ineffectiveness of these earlier testing schemes. 
39. The monitoring and performance problems associated with patronage were most 
severe in urban areas, which had the greatest concentrations of patronage employees 
and the most entrenched party machines. In those cities, the allegiance of patronage 
workers in the post offices and customhouses was most often with the local party boss. 
It is not surprising, then, that federal politicians from urban areas experienced the great- 
est loss of control over their appointees. Further, these were the same areas where con- 
stituents were demanding improvements in the quality of federal services. Hence, the 
very strength of the local urban machine provided the motivation for a vote-maximizing 
federal politician to break with the local party and support a reduction in patronage. 
This particular argument is presented more formally in app. A. 
40. Hoogenboom (1968, 10). Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts introduced 
legislation for the establishment of a merit system in 1864, but it did not go far. 
41. While there are differences in the way the British and U.S. civil service systems 
developed, there are also important similarities. Prior to 1850, patronage was the means 
for staffing the British bureaucracy. There were numerous disputes over the rights to 
appointments and mismanagement that attracted public attention. Reform occurred dur- 
ing the Victorian era, a time when the size of the British government was expanding. 
See, e.g., the account by Gladden (1967). 
42. Dorman’s  Civil Service  is discussed in Skowronek (1982, 48) and Van  Riper 
(1958, 82-85). 
43. For discussion of the actions of the first federal Civil Service Commission, see 
Van Riper (1958,68-71). 
44. For discussion of the political campaign, see Sageser (1935, 48-53)  and Van 
Riper (1958, 89-94).  In senate hearings, Pendleton stressed the costs of patronage and 
its impact on the functioning of government. He linked the growth of  government to 
the downfall of patronage and then went on to describe the effect on the president and 
the Congress. For example, he claimed that “the Executive Mansion is besieged, if not 
sacked, and its comdors and chambers are crowded each day with the ever-changing, 
but neverending, throng” (US. Senate, “Report,” 1882, 2). 
45. The final votes appear in the Congressional Record, 47th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 661 
(Senate), 867 (House). Discussion is provided in Sageser (1935, 57-59). 
46. For discussion of this point, see Skowronek (1982,69). 
47. Section 11 of the Pendleton Act prohibited any member of Congress, the judi- 
ciary, or the executive office from soliciting or receiving “any assessment, subscription, 46  Chapter2 
or contribution for any  political purpose  whatever.” Section  13 enjoined the use of 
threats of  discharge, demotion, or, alternatively, promotion to solicit funds “or other 
valuable thing for any political purpose”; sec. 14 prohibited the granting of  money or 
other services by  federal employees for “the promotion of any political object”; and 
sec. 15 levied penalties for violation of these provisions of a $5,000 fine and/or impris- 
onment of three years. 
48. Party affiliations were obtained by  using the Congressional Quarterly? Guide to 
US.  Elections (1985) and the Biographical Directory of  the United States Congress: 
49. Information  on pairings  and positions  was  obtained  from the  Congressional 
50. Likelihood ratio tests of whether the contribution of the composite regression is 
5 1. On the procedure for evaluating the derivatives of the probabilities in logit mod- 
52. Essentially, this is the hypothesis advanced by Van Riper (1958). 
53. In explaining the shift to merit, we emphasize organizational size and the prob- 
lems facing politicians of managing the patronage labor force as its numbers increased. 
This view is supported by the statistical results in table 2.3. The historical literature on 
civil service reform, however, focuses on exogenous factors, the role of reform groups 
in urban areas who pressured Congress to adopt merit. As a partial test of this compet- 
ing hypothesis, we replaced the customhouse/post office variable in  eqq (1)  and (2) 
with an urbanization variable, which took the value of one if the representative’s  district 
was in one of the fifty largest cities in the United States. Urbanization increases the 
probability of voting in favor of the Pendleton Act, but comparisons of the log of the 
likelihood functions of the two specifications indicate that the presence of a customs or 
postal installation explicitly targeted by the Pendleton Act in a representative’s district 
is a better predictor of voting than is the urbanization variable. It should also be noted 
that a number of large post offices and customhouses were not located within one of 
the fifty largest cities in  1880: Portland (Maine), Burlington (Vermont), Port Huron 
(Michigan), and Kansas City. For discussion, see Johnson and Libecap (1994). 
54. This result is consistent with Lott and Bronars’s (1993) analysis showing that 
members of Congress who have announced their pending retirement do not alter their 
votes from their historical voting patterns. 
55. As an additional test of our key variable, post office/customhouse, we applied 
the same specification reported in table 2.3 to the House vote on the Jenckes bill. The 
results are as follows: 
1774-1989 (1989). 
Record, 47th Cong., 2d sess., 1882, pp. 867-68. 
significantly different from zero are also reported for each equation in table 2.3. 
els, see Maddala (1983, 23). 
Variable 
Post officelcustomhouse  1.03 
(2.07) 
Democrat  -.80 
(-1.62) 
Other  -  .52 
(p.85) 
Southern Democrat  -.73 
(-.61) 
Variable 
Lame duck  .13 
(.35) 
Years in office  .08 
(1  .OO) 
Constant  -.38 
(-.9l) 
Log-likelihood function  -89.67 
(Source: The vote is recorded in Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 2d sess., 1867, pp. 
1034-36.  Other variables are taken from the Congressional Quarterly? Guide to US. 
Elections [I9851 and the Biographical Directory of  the United States Congress: 1774- 47  Replacing Political Patronage with Merit 
1989 [ 19891. Note:  Asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses.) The vote on the Jenckes bill 
occurred in 1867, at a time when the House was dominated by Republicans. Thus, this 
can explain why  party  membership is not statistically significant in the above logit 
model. On the other hand, the coefficient on the post officekustomhouse variable is 
positive and significantly different from zero. This result further  supports our con- 
tention that organization size and problems of  managing a growing patronage labor 
force were instrumental in fostering institutional change. 
56. Stewart is interested, not specifically in patronage, but in broader budget and 
appropriations issues. 
57. Wilson (1989) discusses pork barrel exchanges, but he is interested in the distri- 
bution of  the pork to explain the broad coalitions that arose to support it. His tests 
support the notion of  universalism. Stewart (1989, 89-98)  also examines support for 
river and harbor legislation and water projects as part of his analysis of  the budgeting 
process. 
58. U.S. Department of  Commerce (1975, 1104). Stewart (1989, 69) notes that there 
were “embarrassingly large surpluses” in the 1880s. 